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We evaluate the effects of the duration of legislative terms on the performance of legislators. We exploit
a natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives where term lengths were assigned
randomly. Results for various objective measures of legislative output show that longer terms enhance
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our results are specific to a particular chamber and a particular time. The results from the Senate reinforce
the idea that longer terms enhance legislative productivity. Our results highlight limits to classic theories
of electoral discipline (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986) predicting that shorter terms, by tightening accountability,
will incentivize hard work by politicians. We discuss and test possible explanations. Our results suggest
that the "accountability logic" is overcome by an "investment logic."
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A fundamental problem in constitutional design is to decide for how long o¢ cials should
serve before they can be replaced. In the case of democratically elected representatives the
problem boils down to one of frequency of elections. Short term lengths should have at least
two advantages. One is to allow for the quick reversal of bad appointments. The other
is that more frequent accountability should keep representatives on their toes, leading to
better representation of voters￿interests. The latter notion is advanced in the classic papers
by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) on electoral discipline. In their models, when o¢ ce
terms are made shorter politicians lose discretion, exert more e⁄ort, and extract lower rents
from citizens. According to these models, more frequent accountability should always make
politicians work harder. But does it? This is a question lying at the root of the process
of political representation. Still, there is a striking dearth of empirical work identifying the
e⁄ects of term length on political performance. In this paper we o⁄er evidence on such e⁄ects
and examine whether political incentives respond to some other force beyond accountability.
There are reasons why shortening o¢ ce terms too much may back￿re. For starters, elec-
tions are costly to organize. Moreover, very frequent elections will distract both politicians
and citizens from productive activities. And it is also possible that politicians may need
longer time horizons in order to invest in assets speci￿c to their political position. The re-
sulting picture is one where the frequency of elections could a⁄ect various incentives at once.
As a consequence, it is not obvious whether and how term lengths should matter.
The length of legislative terms varies substantially around the world (see Table 1). One
could be tempted to exploit the cross-country variation in legislative term lengths to try
to ascertain their e⁄ects on legislative performance. However, di⁄erent nations may select
di⁄erent term lengths because they face di⁄erent incentive trade-o⁄s. Because the length of
terms is endogenous, exploiting the cross-country variation cannot help identify the e⁄ects of
longer terms. An alternative approach would be to focus on a single legislature with staggered
terms, such as the Senate of the United States, and study the e⁄ects of the proximity of
elections on performance. As we discuss in the following section on related literature, this
avenue poses serious identi￿cation problems as well.
Our main objective in this paper is to investigate the e⁄ects of term lengths in a way that
overcomes the various identi￿cation di¢ culties involved. To this end we exploit a natural
experiment in the Argentine legislature introducing exogenous variation in legislative term
lengths. We ￿nd that the length of terms does matter, and that shorter terms worsen
legislative performance. A second objective of the paper is to discuss and test possible
explanations for the results.
Argentina restored democracy on December 10 of 1983, after seven years of dictatorship.
2On that day a newly elected set of legislators took o¢ ce. House representatives in Argentina
face no term limits and their terms are four years long. Also, the Constitution requires
the staggered renewal of the House chamber by halves every two years. In order to get the
staggered renewal mechanism going, half of the representatives elected in 1983 got two-year
terms, and the other half got four-year terms. The allocation of two- and four-year terms
in this Congress of 1983 was done through a well documented random assignment. We
exploit this exogenous variation to explore the impact of the duration of legislative terms
on the performance of individual legislators. We use all six objective measures of legislative
performance that we found, namely attendance to ￿ oor sessions, participation in ￿ oor debates
(measured by number of speeches), committee activity (attendance to committee sessions
and participation in the production of committee bills), the number of bills each member
introduced, and how many of these became law.
We compare the levels of legislative performance of the two-year-term legislators to those
of their four-year counterparts. We do this for the ￿rst two years of legislative activity, while
both groups worked side by side. The e⁄ect of term duration is consistent in its direction
across all six metrics of performance, and we found strongly signi￿cant results for metrics
related to attendance, committee work, and the production of legislation.
Overall, the picture indicates that legislators facing shorter terms display signi￿cantly
lower measures of legislative performance. The immediate question is why. We ￿rst consider
a possibility pertinent to any natural experiment relying on a lottery. Namely, the lottery
outcome could have a direct impact on performance through a ￿frustration￿e⁄ect on those
drawing a short term, or an ￿encouragement￿ e⁄ect on those drawing a long term. We
￿nd no evidence of such e⁄ects, strengthening the idea that the lottery did trigger a genuine
treatment e⁄ect. The following question is: what explains the positive e⁄ects of longer terms
on performance?
There are two main candidate explanations we consider. The ￿rst is simply that the
two-year legislators must spend a good part of their term campaigning for reelection. This
is a rather mechanical e⁄ect occurring simply because campaigns are distractive. A second
explanation is that the time horizon facing a legislator a⁄ects her choice of involvement
because of an investment logic. If all legislative activity were instantaneous in the sense that
every e⁄ort leads to an immediate reward, time horizons should not matter. But in reality
legislators may need to sink certain costs if they want to reap bene￿ts in terms of future
political payo⁄s. The type of costs may range from staying late at night in order to absorb
information that will prove useful during a series of debates, to buying an apartment near
the legislature. Thus, longer terms may encourage higher performance because they make
more investments appear worthwhile. This explanation is plausible in the Argentine context
where the mean time lag between the introduction and the approval of a legislative bill is
3327 days (without counting the time spent preparing the project) and where reelection rates
are low (the reelection rate for the legislators in our sample turned out to be 25%).
We took the campaigning hypothesis to our data. Under this hypothesis, the performance
di⁄erentials should widen closer to the end of the two years we observe. Moreover, and as
advised by the legislators we interviewed, the performance di⁄erential should be wider for
legislators whose constituencies are farther away from Buenos Aires, the seat of Congress.
We tested these two predictions and found no clear pattern of support for either of them. We
then turned to the time-horizon cum investment hypothesis. If the time horizon matters, one
would expect the e⁄ects of being dealt a longer term to be less marked for legislators who are
electorally safer. After all, safe legislators have a guaranteed long time horizon regardless
of their term length. This prediction meets with substantial support from the data. We
conclude that the reason why legislators with longer terms perform better is connected to
incentives being a⁄ected by the time horizon. In other words, the accountability logic appears
to be overcome by an investment logic.
Natural experiments illustrate the trade-o⁄between internal and external validity. They
sometimes allow for credible inference of causal e⁄ects, but each experiment is necessarily
limited to a speci￿c instance in time and space. Here we take a step towards addressing the
external validity issue by identifying a second natural experiment, seventeen years later, in
the Argentine Senate. This experiment is analogous to the ￿rst, but it entailed the random
assignment of 71 senators to two-, four-, and six-year terms.
This second experiment yields evidence in three directions. First, it broadly corroborates
the notion that longer terms enhance legislative performance, even when we focus on a di⁄er-
ent chamber and on a di⁄erent year. Second, it allows us to contrast again the campaigning
versus the time horizon hypothesis by comparing four- and six-year term senators during
their ￿rst two years in o¢ ce. At that stage, no senators are active in campaigning. Yet
we ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences in performance in favor of the six-year term legislators. This
further strengthens the idea that it is the time horizon, and not campaigning distractions,
that drives performance di⁄erentials. Third, the experiment in the Senate allows us to ex-
amine the time horizon e⁄ects in more detail. If time horizons matter because they a⁄ect
investment, a relevant question is what is the nature of such investments. Are these generic
and cumulative, so that term lengths will no longer matter once legislators have had a long
tenure in o¢ ce? This would be the case with investments in general legislative knowledge
brought by learning by doing. A general expertise can be re-deployed to di⁄erent uses in
the future and hence have a low rate of obsolescence. However, we found no evidence that
longer terms have less of an e⁄ect on legislators with previous experience. Thus, if invest-
ments a⁄ect expertise, some form of expertise depreciation could take place, presumably
4because issues change and new investments become neecessary over time.1
As the Barro and Ferejohn models show, longer terms may entail costs in terms of relaxed
accountability. But our empirical study shows that, at least while terms are fairly short,
extending terms entails bene￿ts in terms of measured performance that outweigh the costs.
Those bene￿ts do not appear to stem from a simple campaign distraction problem riddling
short terms, but from a pure time horizon e⁄ect. The importance of the time horizon
highlights an investment logic: legislators are more likely to incur costs tied to legislative
activity when guaranteed a longer term in o¢ ce. This explanation was rated as highly
plausible by the legislators we interviewed. Lastly, the investment logic does not appear
to work in connection with the accumulation of a generic stock of expertise that once put
together renders legislators indi⁄erent to the time horizon.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related literature. In
Section 3 we describe the natural experiment and present the data. In Section 4 we lay out
the econometric model and report the results. We discuss and test possible explanations
in Section 5. Section 6 reports results from a second natural experiment in the Argentine
Senate. Section 7 contains our conclusions.
2 Related literature
To the best of our knowledge there is a dearth of empirical studies focusing speci￿cally on the
e⁄ects of term lengths. Apart from our own work, an exception is the research by Titiunik
(2008), who studies the e⁄ects of randomly assigned term lengths on abstention rates and
bills introduced by state senators in Arkansas and Texas. The direction of her results corrob-
orates those we found. A small literature has attempted to identify whether US legislators
behave di⁄erently when approaching reelection, mostly in terms of their voting (but see Lott
1987 who focuses on vote participation). Amacher and Boyes (1978) exploit the staggered
composition of the US Senate and compare￿ for the 93rd Congress￿ the voting records of US
senators who di⁄er in the proximity of their reelection. They ￿nd that senators closer to
reelection vote more in line with representatives (who presumably proxy for constituency
interests). Thomas (1985) tracks the voting pattern of senators in their third versus their
sixth year, ￿nding a moderating tendency of election proximity. Kalt and Zupan (1990) also
report that senators seem to alter their voting pattern when approaching reelection.
Lott and Davis (1992) provide further references in this area. Their discussion empha-
sizes that most of the papers attempting to identify the e⁄ects of electoral proximity focused
1The same conclusion obtains when using our House data. However, in 1983 there were very few legislators
with previous experience due to the preceding dictatorship, so the test is not very powerful.
5on voting patterns and su⁄ered from measurement and speci￿cation problems.2 It is worth
noting that most studies tracking legislators as they approach reelection will tend to con-
found the pure e⁄ect of the time horizon with those of changing political circumstances. The
alternative approach of exploiting the staggered structure of the Senate to observe contem-
poraneous behavior by legislators elected at di⁄erent times will tend to confound the e⁄ects
of the proximity of elections with those of tenure. Tenure e⁄ects may involve sorting e⁄ects
and changes in legislators￿political capital. Even if one can control for tenure, focusing
on legislators elected at di⁄erent points in time introduces unobserved heterogeneity. For
example, the electoral promises made in separate years could di⁄er, and so may the extent
to which legislators feel they can depart from the implicit electoral contract. Ideally, one
would want to observe legislators appointed at the exact same time, who di⁄er only in the
term length they are assigned. This is what our design provides, therefore avoiding the
aforementioned identi￿cation problems.
Crain and Tollison (1977) consider governorships as investment projects for politicians
and compare campaign expenditures across races for two- versus four-year positions. They
￿nd that expenditures are larger when campaigning for a four-year governorship than along
two consecutive campaigns for two-year governorships. These results are consistent with
the direction and logic behind ours, although one cannot rule out the possibility that their
results may re￿ ect selection forces: better candidates may run in states that happen to
have four-year governorships. It is then conceivable that those candidates would attract
more campaign contributions due to their higher quality, and then spend more because of a
stronger campaign chest.
A much larger literature has analyzed the e⁄ects of term limits.3 Term-limit restrictions
are interesting per se, but they pose a di⁄erent problem to that of term lengths. To be sure,
holding constant term lengths, the imposition of term limits should tend to reduce the time
horizon in o¢ ce. But term limits also introduce a lame duck period and associated e⁄ects
stemming from the anticipation of that last period.4 Term lengths, in contrast, a⁄ect the
2Lott and Davis reexamine data for US senators and ￿nd that the proximity of elections does not sig-
ni￿cantly a⁄ect voting behavior in the US Senate. The general consensus in the profession since then has
converged on the idea that voting patterns in the Congress of the United States are largely independent from
electoral pressure (see Poole and Rosenthal 1997 and Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004).
3The work in that area has focused intensely on consequences for turnover (see the papers in the edited
volume by Grofman 1996, and also Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000) and the level of expertise in the legislature.
For the e⁄ect of term limits on the quality of the legislature see Petracca (1995) and Mondak (1995a, 1995b).
Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005) investigate the impact that the imposition of term limits would have
on the value of congressional careers in the United States Congress.
4See Besley and Case (1995) for a study of the e⁄ects of term limits on ￿scal variables across states in
the Unites States and Johnson and Crain (2004) for related evidence from democratic nations.
6time horizon without introducing last period problems.
Our work is more broadly related to the study of legislative performance. Schiller (1995)
uses the number of bills sponsored by a legislator to measure performance and ￿nds that se-
nior senators sponsor more bills than junior members. She also reports a higher performance
for senators that hold committee chairs or are chairs of a large number of subcommittees.
Similar results are reported in Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson (1983) for a few state leg-
islatures in the United States. Weissert (1991) and Haynie (2002) report some evidence
that legislative performance is higher for senior members, for members that hold committee
chairs, for members holding chamber leadership positions, and for members of the majority
party. As we will show below, the picture in the Argentine legislature is more nuanced.
Although legislators in positions of leadership are more visible (they give more speeches),
they do not appear to introduce more bills or to have a better attendance record. However,
they are signi￿cantly more likely to see their bills passed.
Padr￿ i Miquel and Snyder (2004) use subjective measures of legislative performance in
the House of representatives of North Carolina to explore the e⁄ects of legislative tenure.
They ￿nd that the performance of legislators increases with tenure, and they consider learn-
ing by doing as a possible explanation.
A small number of theoretical contributions highlight di⁄erent implications of extending
terms. As mentioned earlier, the classic work by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) yields
a picture where more frequent elections always yield stronger incentives. Contrary to this
view, our results suggest that over some temporal range it is possible to space out elections,
thus saving on electoral costs, while at the same time enhancing incentives for legislative
performance. This of course does not imply that inde￿nitely lengthening terms will continue
to have the same e⁄ect. Maskin and Tirole (2004) study the relative convenience of subjecting
a politician to reelection or insulating her from that pressure￿ thus turning her into a ￿judge.￿
The optimal choice depends on how eager the politician is to be reelected as this determines
the likelihood that reelection concerns may distort policy choices. Schultz (2008) considers
a model where representatives have private information and must make policy decisions
with an eye towards getting reelected. In his model the degree of partisan polarization and
the severity of uncertainty interact to make both short and long terms potentially optimal
depending on the prevailing parameter con￿guration.
73 Natural experiment and data
3.1 The natural experiment
Argentina is a federal republic consisting of twenty four legislative districts: twenty three
provinces and an autonomous federal district. The National Congress has two chambers,
the Chamber of Deputies (i.e., the House) and the Senate.5 At the time of the return to
democracy in December 1983, all 254 deputies were elected at the same time, starting their
terms on December 10, 1983. In Argentina deputies have four-year terms and the Constitu-
tion requires the renewal of half the chamber every two years. In order to get the staggered
renewal mechanism going it was necessary to allocate half of the representatives elected in
1983 to two-year terms. The allocation of two- and four-year terms in this foundational
Congress was done through random assignment.
In order to assign terms, the 254 representatives were ￿rst divided into two groups of
127 representatives each. As shown in Table 2, the allocation into groups 1 and 2 was
done in such a way that all province districts and political parties were, whenever possible,
proportionally represented in each group. The procedure for the random allocation of terms,
set by the Comisi￿n de Labor Parlamentaria (the equivalent of the Rules committee in the
US) involved dividing the representatives in two groups of equal size, Group 1 and Group 2.
Each party-province delegation had to apportion an equal number of its members to each
group.6 In the case that a party had an odd number of representatives from one province
the imbalance was corrected with the analogous surplus from another province where the
party also had an odd number of representatives. During a public legislative session on
January 20 of 1984, the Secretario Parlamentario jointly with a representative from each
party performed the lottery draw, which gave legislators in Group 1 a four year term and
legislators in Group 2 a two year term.
As just mentioned, legislators were assigned to the groups by the party-province dele-
gations. At the point when legislators were assigned to groups 1 and 2 the party-province
delegations did not know which group would get assigned the long term. Thus, behind a veil
of ignorance regarding which group would be assigned the long term, delegations that are not
risk loving should have no incentive to induce imbalances in their assignment of individuals
to groups. As we show below, all observable characteristics are balanced between the two
groups.
5For a description of Argentine Congress see Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin (1999) and Jones et al. (2007).
6The two representatives the district of Tierra del Fuego (the smallest district) were allocated into the
same group
83.2 Data and measures of performance
Our dataset contains yearly information on individual performance and legislator charac-
teristics for the two-year period starting in December 1983 and ending on December 1985.
Our period of interest in terms of studying the e⁄ects of the assignment of term lengths is
from the time of the assignment in late January of 1984 until December of 1985. From the
254 legislators that started their term in December 1983, three resigned and ￿ve died before
December 1985. Thus the sample includes 492 observations corresponding to 246 legislators
for two years.
The database includes six objective measures of legislative performance by each legisla-
tor: ￿ oor attendance (as the percentage of legislative ￿ oor sessions), committee attendance
(as percentage of committee sessions), number of committee bills in which the legislator par-
ticipated (as re￿ ected on the committee bills bearing the legislator￿ s signature), number of
times the legislator spoke on the ￿ oor (non-legislative topics are not included), the number
of bills introduced by the legislator, and the number of those bills that were approved.
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the six measures we use. The two measures that
are most highly correlated are committee attendance and the number of committee bills
signed (correlation coe¢ cient equal to 0:49). Attendance to ￿ oor sessions and committee
sessions, which one would expect to be very strongly correlated, display a correlation of 0:39.
But most correlations are much weaker and in some cases negative. Overall, we concluded
that these measures hold separate interest as proxies of legislative performance.
It is di¢ cult to rank these measures in terms of which ones do the best job at capturing
legislative activity. The legislators we interviewed held the view that the various metrics
capture di⁄erent aspects of a legislator￿ s performance, and that this is useful given that
di⁄erent legislators cultivate di⁄erent pro￿les. Some legislators may be very active at in-
troducing bills and seeking to capture the attention of constituents, while others are more
active at pushing the party agenda through committee work, bipartisan negotiations, or by
voicing party positions. The latter tasks may in turn attract di⁄erent types of legislators.
Those with an ability for drafting legislation will tend to get involved in more painstaking
work within committee, while those with a talent for rhetorics will be more active as ￿ oor
speakers. An illustrative example is that of the brothers Adolfo and Marcelo Stubrin, who
belonged to the Uni￿n C￿vica Radical. Marcelo was the higher pro￿le legislator, with oratory
skills. He averaged almost 14 speeches a year, against only 8 of his brother. But his brother
attended 71% of his committee meetings, against Marcelo￿ s meagre 17%. Adolfo signed over
46 committee bills a year, against only 20 by Marcelo.
There is also a potential contrast between styles geared towards position-taking as op-
posed to enacting e⁄ective legislation. Of the 123 bills introduced by Domingo Purita (Pero-
9nist Party, Province of Buenos Aires), only one passed, suggesting that the legislative activity
of this representative was mainly oriented to signaling certain concerns to constituents. As
an example of a contrasting pro￿le consider the case of Jesœs Rodriguez (UCR, City of
Buenos Aires), who would go on to play an important role in the Budget committee. Such a
comparatively ￿policy oriented￿legislator attained an identical number of passed bills (one),
having introduced exactly that one bill. One can make the argument that introducing bills
that do not pass may be politically relevant, so the measure of bills introduced is indeed
relevant. It is possible that unsuccessful bills could create, o⁄-equilibrium, options that end
up a⁄ecting the ￿nal content of the bills that do pass. Unsuccessful bills may also generate
valuable debate. But we may also want to have an independent measure of ￿bill e⁄ective-
ness￿that captures the contrast in pro￿les just illustrated. Our measure of bills actually
passed provides such measure, and a look at the data suggests that there are indeed di⁄er-
ent pro￿les in terms of volume of bills introduced and the share of them that pass. (The
correlation coe¢ cient between bills introduced and bills passed is just 0:13.)
Is attendance relevant? One might argue that even a relatively unproductive legislator
may display high attendance. However, attendance may re￿ ect general involvement with
the daily legislative business, which is important for a⁄ecting the drafting of legislation in
committee, and also for building consensus and unlocking negotiations. While the latter role
may not correlate well with the number of bills individually introduced, it may be better
captured by ￿ oor and committee attendance ￿gures. An illustrative case is that of CØsar
Jaroslavsky (UCR, Province of Entre R￿os), who was not involved in speci￿c committee
work nor introduced many bills of his own, but who played a major political role as majority
leader. His important work may be best captured by the fact that he was present in over
94% of all ￿ oor sessions, placing second in the attendance ranking. Although attendance
may obey to leadership responsibilities, there is strong variation in attendance conditional
on occupying leadership positions (in fact, occupying a leadership position has a positive but
insigni￿cant e⁄ect on ￿ oor attendance). Conditional on the type and status of a legislator,
it is conceivable that attendance will re￿ ect variations in the level of e⁄ort or legislative
involvement.
For the reasons exposed here and the feedback from legislators, we believe the metrics
available to us, while noisy, do proxy for di⁄erent dimensions of legislative performance.
The legislators we interviewed thought that ￿ oor speaking is perhaps the metric that is least
correlated with e⁄ort. They conjectured that ￿ oor speaking would be mostly associated with
being a legislator of a certain ￿type.￿In particular, frequent speakers would be those whom
the party trusts to do a good rhetorical job, those who happen to occupy positions of leader-
ship, and those belonging to a small block. Given that every party gets at least one speech
slot per debate, members of very small blocks would get to speak in every important session.
10As we discuss in the results section, these impressions of the legislators are corroborated by
the data.
The variable of interest is Four-year term, an indicator variable that takes the value of
one for those legislators which were randomly assigned to an initial four-year term and zero
otherwise. The database also includes a number of legislator characteristics, such as age (as
of November 1983), male (a dummy variable that takes the value of one for male legislators),
legislative inexperience at the national level (a dummy variable that takes the value of one
for freshmen), being a lawyer (a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the legislator
is a lawyer), holding a university degree (a dummy variable that takes the value of one
for legislators with a university degree but that are not lawyers), leadership (a dummy
variable that takes the value of one for legislators that are president of the chamber, chair of
a committee, and majority or minority leader), belonging to the majority party (a dummy
variable that takes the value of one for members of the majority party), belonging to a small
block (a dummy taking the value of one for legislators belonging to a block containing less
than four legislators), the distance in kilometers from the capital of the legislator￿ s province
to Buenos Aires, and a set of dummy variables for province district.7
Representatives in Argentina are elected through a closed party list at the provincial
level, and not through a uninominal race at the level of a smaller legislative district, as in
the United States. Under the party list system, the degree of electoral safety depends on
how high up in the party ticket a legislator ￿nds herself. If the delegation from a given
party and province includes n members, that means that those members closer to the nth
position in the ticket were more likely to stay out under more adverse electoral scenarios.
Those legislators closer to the nth position in the ticket face risk going forward, given that
the position in a future party list depends largely on relatively permanent factors, such as
the demographics of the area from which legislators come within the province. We develop
a dummy variable to capture electoral safety in the following way: we will say a legislator
is relatively safe if she entered Congress within the top half of her delegation, and that she
is relatively at risk otherwise. In this spirit, we de￿ne a dummy variable called Slackness
that is equal to one whenever the legislator belongs to the upper half of the party-province
delegation, and that is equal to zero otherwise.
The probability of receiving a given term length is orthogonal to political party and
province district variables by virtue of the random assignment design. Although the duration
of terms was randomly assigned across the two groups, it is useful to examine whether, ex
post, legislators￿characteristics are balanced between the two- and the four-year term groups.
7Since the return to democracy in 1983 the two dominant political parties in Argentina have been the
Uni￿n C￿vica Radical (Radical party) and the Partido Justicialista (Peronist party). In the period under
analysis the majority party was the Uni￿n C￿vica Radical.
11As shown in Table 4, there are no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences in observables across
the two groups of legislators, suggesting that the randomization was successful in ensuring
orthogonality between covariates and term assignment.
4 Econometric model and results
Given random assignment, the impact of serving an initial four-year term relative to serving
an initial two-year term can be estimated straightforwardly by using the following regression
model:
Yit = ￿ + ￿Four-year Termi + ￿Xi + ￿t + "it (1)
where Yit is any of the performance measures under study for legislator i in period t, ￿ is
the parameter of interest, Xi is a matrix of legislator characteristics, ￿t is a time e⁄ect, and
"it is the error term.
Table 5 reports estimates of the impact of serving a four-year term relative to a two-year
term.8 We present results with and without controls. A typical concern when conducting
inference for the estimated parameters of Equation 1 is that the errors for the same legislator
might not be independent. To address this concern, aside from usual Huber-White robust
standard errors, we report robust standard errors clustered at the legislator level.
Results for the six legislative outputs suggest that legislators serving a four-year term
have a better performance than those in a two-year track and that the di⁄erences in perfor-
mance are important in size. The point estimates of the e⁄ect of a longer term are always
positive. Four out of six metrics display signi￿cant results both with and without controls
and regardless of whether standard errors are clustered.
As reported in Table 5, getting a longer term appears to signi￿cantly increase performance
on ￿ oor attendance by 3% (relative to the mean of the two-year legislators). The impact also
reaches measures of committee performance. Committee attendance is about 12% higher for
long term legislators, and the number of committee bills bearing the legislator￿ s signature
goes up by 14% in the uncontrolled regression, and by 19% in the controlled one. Floor
speaking appears to respond to a longer term ￿ the point estimates indicate an increase of
30% in the uncontrolled regression and a lower 13% in the regression with controls. The latter
regression reveals that the opinions of legislators on the determinants of ￿ oor speaking were
8The variables committee bills, ￿ oor speeches, bills introduced, and bills rati￿ed take discrete values
and are strongly skewed to the right with many observations at zero; consequently, ordinary least squares
estimation would be inappropriate. In all these models we were able to reject the hypothesis that the
dispersion parameter is equal to zero according to a likelihood-ratio test, a result that suggests that the
correct speci￿cation is a negative binomial model for count data.
12on target. In their view, ￿ oor speaking is more a re￿ ection of type than of e⁄ort. Legislators
predicted that ￿ oor speaking would be associated ￿rst and foremost with belonging to a
small block. Indeed, this appears to be the strongest determinant of the frequency of ￿ oor
speaking. They also indicated that occupying a leadership position or being a good orator
would be associated with participating in ￿ oor debates. They were right on this count as well.
A leadership position is a strong predictor of ￿ oor speaking. We do not have a direct measure
of oratory skills, but one could imagine that holding a university degree is correlated with
debating abilities. Holding a university degree (see the coe¢ cients for Lawyer and University
degree) has a similar impact on ￿ oor speaking as holding a leadership position in the internal
hierarchy of the chamber. (The legislators we interviewed indicated that representatives from
remote districts face more of a challenge at maintaining a presence both in their districts
and in the legislature. Table 5 shows that, indeed, performance measures are negatively, and
for the most part very signi￿cantly, impacted when a legislator represents a district that is
far away from Buenos Aires.)
The idea that longer terms increase performance also appears to be backed by the mea-
sures of ￿bill production.￿The point estimates indicate that number of bills introduced goes
up by 14% and 20% respectively in the uncontrolled and controlled models. These estimates,
however, are only marginally signi￿cant in the unclustered regression.9 When we switch at-
tention from the ￿volume￿measure of bill production to the ￿legislative e¢ cacy￿measure,
namely the number of bills that pass, the estimates become strongly signi￿cant. The point
estimates indicate that moving from a two- to a four-year term increases the number of
passed bills by around a 100%. Overall, the results indicate a strong tendency for longer
terms to increase legislative performance.
4.1 Robustness checks
To further validate our results we perform additional estimations under a wide range of
alternative speci￿cations and samples. The value and signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients of inter-
est remain unchanged when we use ordinary least squares instead of the negative binomial
speci￿cation or when we use a Tobit speci￿cation for the case of committee attendance.10
According to the legislators we interviewed the most important legislative committees
in the 1980s were those specializing in defense, foreign a⁄airs, general legislation (which
involves trade and commerce legislation), and the budget. One question is whether legislators
belonging to these important committees display better outcomes, and whether that small
9We later report on results from a posterior natural experiment taking place in the Argentine Senate. In
that case, the number of bills introduced appeared to have a strongly signi￿cant response to term length.
10All regressions mentioned but not shown are available from the authors upon request.
13group could be driving results. To address these questions we estimate an alternative model
including a dummy variable that takes the value of one for those legislators that belong to
an important committee. In most cases the coe¢ cient of this dummy variable is positive but
not signi￿cant. More importantly, including that control does not appear to have any e⁄ect
on the magnitude or signi￿cance of the term length variable.
We also investigate the robustness of our results to alternative samples. The value and
signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients of interest remain mostly unchanged when we exclude from
the sample those legislators that were leaders of the chamber. We tried di⁄erent de￿nitions
of leaderhip and we found similar results.
To explore if there is heterogeneity in the e⁄ect of term lengths according to political
party, we run separate regressions for the two main parties at that time. Despite the smaller
sample size, we still ￿nd positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients for the term length variable for
most of the measures of legislative performance.
Together with the number of committee bills signed, our main measures of pure legislative
output are the number of bills each member introduced, and how many of these became law.
We explore an alternative de￿nition that considers not only the bills a legislator introduced
but also those that she endorsed. Under the alternative de￿nition the coe¢ cient for bills
introduced is similar to the one obtained previously. The coe¢ cient for bills rati￿ed is
smaller, but the magnitude of the e⁄ect is still important (moving from a two- to a four-year
term increases the number of bills approved by around 45%). The signi￿cance levels remain
unchanged for both variables.
Finally, the signi￿cance of the term length variable is not a⁄ected when we cluster stan-
dard errors at the district level, or according to party-district combinations.
4.2 Potential concerns
Even when our study relies on a well documented randomization, one can still harbor some
potential concerns regarding the exogeneity of the treatment. First, it could be the case
that after the random assignment was done, re-optimizations took place that might have
a⁄ected performance for reasons other than the change in term length. For example, it
could be that after terms were allocated legislators given a four-year term obtained better
committee assignments or more important positions in the committees they belong to. This
was not the case. Committee assignments as well as leadership positions all along the
internal hierarchy of the chamber were decided before the assignment of terms. Very few
re-allocations are observed after the random assignment, and they are orthogonal to the
term length assignment. Only seven legislators left the most important committees after
the random allocation of terms (four two-year term and three four-year term legislators).
14Of the seven substitutes, three legislators ended their term in 1985 and four in 1987. Of
all legislators who are considered leaders, only two left their position before December 1985
(one two-year term and one four-year term legislator). One of the substitutes ended his
term in 1985 and the other in 1987. Results remain unchanged when we exclude from the
sample those legislators that change status as chamber leaders or moved in or out of the
most important committees.
Second, it could be that the outcome of the lottery directly a⁄ects the morale of legisla-
tors, boosting the spirits of those who got a four-year term, and depressing the rest. In this
case, the instrument would not be a⁄ecting behavior through its e⁄ect on the term length,
but directly through its ￿win or loss￿meaning. According to the literature in experimental
psychology (see for instance Amsel, 1992), an implication of the frustration hypothesis is
that we should observe an immediate drop in the performance of legislators allocated to
two-year terms, followed by a graduate increase of performance as frustration gets diluted
over time. Figure 1 displays the evolution of the performance di⁄erential across groups on a
monthly basis. We show this for the four measures for which our data allowed such disaggre-
gation. These plots obviate months where the legislature did not register activity. Although
there is no rough and ready de￿nition of exactly how long frustration e⁄ects should last, it is
understood that if present they should a⁄ect only very few months after the randomization.
As Figure 1 shows, the higher performance of four-year legislators seems to constitute a fairly
general pattern beyond the ￿rst few months.
5 Possible explanations
5.1 Campaigning
A ￿rst possible explanation for the positive impact of term duration on performance is that
legislators with shorter terms may get distracted when campaigning for reelection. Two
dimensions, time and space, are relevant to this explanation.
Campaigning for reelection occupies more time as the election gets closer. Therefore,
if campaigning gets in the way of legislative work, one should expect the performance dif-
ferential between four- and two-year legislators to increase during the second year. The
other relevant dimension is distance. As indicated by the legislators we interviewed, the per-
formance di⁄erential against the two-year legislators should be more pronounced for those
representing districts farther away from Buenos Aires, where the legislature is located. The
reason is that the legislators representing remote provinces have to travel far in order to
campaign, and therefore ￿nd it hard to keep up their legislative performance.
We explore the campaigning hypothesis by estimating two speci￿cations including each a
15di⁄erent interaction variable. The ￿time￿speci￿cation (reported in odd-numbered columns
in Table 6) includes an interaction between the four-year variable and a dummy that takes
the value of one for the second year. If the performance di⁄erential in favor of the four-year
legislators gets larger during the second year, we would expect that interaction to be positive.
The other, ￿distance,￿speci￿cation is reported in the even-numbered columns in Table 6,
and it includes an interaction between the four-year variable and the distance from Buenos
Aires to the legislator￿ s province (the location of the latter being proxied by its capital city).
Under the campaigning hypothesis the distance interaction should be positive as well. As
reported in Table 6, in most cases the interaction between the second-year dummy and Four-
year term is not signi￿cant at the usual levels of con￿dence.11 The second year interaction
displays the wrong sign half of the times. The campaigning hypothesis, as captured by
the second year interaction, only pans out in connection with committee attendance and
work (the two most highly correlated performance measures), but these same metrics do not
sustain the campaigning hypothesis as captured by the distance interaction. Overall, it is
not possible to conclude that the data support the campaigning hypothesis. One possibility
may be that campaigning only really hurts two-year legislators in the second year that
happen at the same time to represent distant districts. We estimated a third speci￿cation
(unreported) were we simultaneously include the time and distance interactions, as well as
a triple interaction between the long term variable, the year two dummy, and the distance
variable. That speci￿cation fails again to lend support to the campaigning hypothesis.
Replacing the distance variable with a dummy for legislators that are not from Buenos Aires
does not help the campaigning hypothesis either.
It seems prima facie counter-intuitive that campaigning, being a time-demanding activity,
would not appear to di⁄erentially damage the short-term legislators. But, as was pointed
out by the legislators we interviewed, campaigning in Argentina is to a great extent a team
e⁄ort at the party level. Legislators that are not running for o¢ ce often campaign alongside
those who are.
5.2 Time horizon e⁄ects and the investment logic
The second broad explanation for the result that longer terms enhance legislative perfor-
mance is that the time horizon a⁄ects legislators￿incentives. In a world where legislative
activity is instantaneous in the sense that every unit of e⁄ort brings its reward immediately,
legislators could have great incentives to exert e⁄ort even if their terms were short. But
in a world where e⁄ort brings non-immediate rewards, time horizons will be relevant. One
11Similar conclusions are obtained when we interact Four-year term with the second-year dummy and
with a dummy variable for being nominated for reelection.
16can see every unit of e⁄ort as an investment project triggering a stream of returns, with
a maturity structure, and a mean time to payback. It is then easy to see that legislators
facing a shorter horizon will more often see some units of e⁄ort to have too long a maturity
to justify paying the cost.
Three questions are pertinent to the plausibility of this explanation. First, is legislative
activity compatible with the idea that some units of e⁄ort may yield returns that are rela-
tively distant in time? In our view the answer is yes for two reasons. One is that the mean
time lag since the introduction of a bill to its approval was, in our sample period, of 327
days, without counting the time of preparation of the bill, which must allow for obtaining
advice and actually drafting the bill. The other reason is that some ￿ projects￿may by their
very nature require long periods to pay back. A legislator may buy an apartment close to
the legislature in order to lower her future costs of attending meetings, or shut down her
private law ￿rm in order not to have a second activity competing for her time and attention.
Shorter-term legislators may decide not to incur these costs. Other opportunities to incur
costs may appear more continuously. For instance, a legislator may often have to decide
whether to spend time absorbing information that will be useful during an upcoming series
of legislative debates. For example, in the 1980s legislators in Argentina faced a number of
crucial legislative debates including one on a peace treaty with Chile ￿ the ￿rst of a series
that would resolve a string of border issues stretching into the 1990s. A legislator may decide
to learn various details about that topic, which may yield bene￿ts in terms of allowing the
legislator to draft her own bill on the matter, introducing amendments, or weighing in on
negotiations. These investments may pay back a stream of returns stretching for as long as
the topic remains current, which may be a few years.
A second question on the plausibility of the time horizon explanation is whether a change
from a two- to a four-year term could signi￿cantly a⁄ect the e⁄ective time horizon facing
legislators. The answer is yes because of the low reelection rates in Argentina. This rate was
of 25% for our sample of legislators. A third question is whether legislators would have a
reason to make any investments, and to vary them according to term lengths. First, a better
performance may leave a better legislative legacy. Second, the probability of reelection is
positively and signi￿cantly related to three out of six performance measures (for the other
measures the relationship is not signi￿cant).
For these three reasons (time lags between costs and returns to legislative activity, low
reelection chances, and some sensitivity of reelection chance to performance) we believe that
the time horizon explanation is plausible. We now proceed to test it. The time horizon
hypothesis yields an implication we can take to the data: legislators who are relatively safer
electorally should care less about the term length they get dealt. In one extreme, term length
does not a⁄ect the expected time in o¢ ce for someone whose reelection is guaranteed. In
17the other extreme, the term length a⁄ects one for one the expected tenure of someone who
is certain not to be reelected. As a result, if safer legislators care less about term length, an
interaction variable between being safer and getting the four-year term should be negative.
The variable capturing electoral safety is the variable ￿slackness￿introduced in the data
section. In Table 7 we report results indicating that the interaction of the Four-year term
variable and the electoral safety measure has the right sign for ￿ve of our six performance
meausures (the estimate is not statistically signi￿cant in the case where the sign goes in
the unexpected direction). In four of the six measures we see statistically signi￿cant results,
and these results are robust to clustering in the case of three measures: ￿ oor attendance,
committee attendance, and the number of bills that are approved. For these metrics being
electorally safe appears to undo a substantial portion, and sometimes all, of the e⁄ect of
being dealt a longer term.
Overall, these results tend to corroborate the idea that the e⁄ect of term length is to
enhance legislative productivity because of its impact on the time horizon facing legislators.
In other words, the accountability logic in the Barro-Ferejohn models appears to be overcome
by an investment logic.
5.3 Intertemporal cooperation and social norms
There is an alternative investment logic story that is not exclusively focused on individual
incentives and incorporates collective considerations. It is possibble that legislators may ￿in-
vest￿by working hard early in their terms in order to be allowed to shirk later, as part of a
repeated game equilibrium where shirking early would trigger a collective reversion to shirk-
ing. There are two di⁄erent models one can write that capture this story.12 First consider
a cohort of in￿nitely lived legislators elected for a single period but who can be reelected
for ever.13 Legislation is seen as a voluntary contribution game. Legislators may contribute
low, medium, or high levels of e⁄ort. E⁄ort is privately costly but legislative output is col-
lectively bene￿cial, so each legislator would rather shirk and have others contribute. It is
possible to characterize conditions involving the reelection probability (which acts as a dis-
count factor), the costs of e⁄ort, and the returns to legislation, such that legislators cannot
sustain high levels of cooperation when their terms last for a single period. At the same
time, it is possible to characterize conditions such that legislators with two-period terms will
be able to sustain an equilibrium where they cooperate at high levels during the ￿rst half of
12The two models we describe next are available upon request.
13The models described below are related to that by Dickson and Shepsle (2001). They o⁄er an interesting
treatment with overlapping generations of ￿nitely lived players. On perfect equilibria of ￿nitely repeated
games, see also Benoit and Krishna (1985). We focus on in￿nitely lived players in order to abstract from the
last period issues and better capture the Argentine context, where term limits are not present.
18their terms, while allowing themselves to cooperate at medium levels during the second half.
This pro￿le is sustained by the threat of reverting to low cooperation if anyone deviates. In
this model, extending term lengths from one to two periods allows stronger cooperation and
higher performance.
Closer to the case of the Argentine legislature with its staggered renewal structure, con-
sider next a version of the same game with overlapping cohorts of in￿nitely lived legislators.
It is again possible to characterize conditions under which the extension of term lengths
will make stronger cooperation possible. As a result, the fact that the empirical e⁄ects we
identify could be driven by social norms pinning down equilibria in repeated games does
not necessarily change the policy implications. In these models longer terms allow for more
cooperation with and without overlapping generations of players. The only exception occurs
in the case where we assume that the legislature has a ￿xed amount of work to do, and the
social norm simply allocates it unevenly, having legislators who are farther from reelection
bear a larger share of the burden. This asymmetry could result directly from the staggered
structure of the chamber regardless of the length of terms. It is however di¢ cult to imagine
why legislators would prefer lopsided e⁄ort allocations if overall productivity is ￿xed and
they do not care about time horizons. In such a situation both discounting motives and,
under any convexity in the costs of e⁄ort, a desire to smooth e⁄ort over time would create a
strict preference against lopsided allocations. These are hard to justify without a cooperation
argument like the one discussed above.
Our data does not allow a conclusive test rejecting an explanation relying on social norms.
But we have two reasons to be con￿dent that such mechanisms are not at play in the Ar-
gentine context. First, the e⁄ects we identify appear sensitive to legislators￿e⁄ective time
horizon (i.e., the degree of electoral safety matters). This indicates that a social norm tied
to the term length cannot be the whole explanation.14 Secondly, we consulted legislators
for their interpretation of the results. They spontaneously suggested the possibility that the
time horizon may a⁄ect the calculus of individual legislators, as well as the possibility that
campaign distractions might matter. The legislators we talked to considered very implau-
sible that intertemporal cooperation agreements could shape levels of performance in the
Argentine context. (This is sensible given the low reelection rates in Argentina, but could
be plausible in other contexts.) Their view was that there are many degrees of freedom in
the individual choice of involvement by legislators, and that these choices could be a⁄ected
by the time horizon facing them.
14To be sure, one could still construct a game where players condition on the e⁄ective time horizon, rather
than on the remainder of one￿ s term. However, given the likely lack of common knowledge on the e⁄ective
time horizon facing di⁄erent individuals, such an equilibrium is highly implausible.
196 Additional evidence from the Senate
An important question is to what extent are our results unique to the House of representatives
and to a speci￿c instance in time. In order to address such concerns, we looked for a
second natural experiment, and found one in the Argentine Senate in 2001. This second
instance, taking place seventeen years later, involved very di⁄erent economic and political
circumstances.
As a result of a constitutional reform in 1994, the whole Senate needed to be renewed
in 2001, when the body￿ s 71 senators were elected at the same time to start their terms
on December 10.15 The modi￿cation of term lengths and renewal rates required that some
senators be assigned two-year terms, others four-year terms, and others six-year terms. The
allocation was done through a well documented random assignment during a public legislative
session on December 12 of 2001. The random assignment was performed at the district level
(each district has three senators); so this natural experiment does now allow us to control
for district e⁄ects.
Our dataset for the Senate contains yearly information on legislative outcomes and legisla-
tor characteristics for the two-year period starting in December 2001 and ending in December
2003. The database made available to us includes only three objective measures of legislative
performance: ￿ oor attendance, the number of bills introduced by each legislator, and the
number of bills that, having been introduced by each legislator, were also approved. We have
no information on committee activity and on-the-￿ oor activity due to lack of records. Of the
71 legislators that started their term in December 2001, six resigned before December 2003.
Thus the sample includes 130 observations corresponding to 65 legislators for two years.16
We de￿ne the Long term dummy as a variable taking the value one if the senator got a
four- or six-year term, and the value zero if the legislator got a two-year term. The Panel
1 in Table 8 reports results on speci￿cations like those in Table 5. The point estimate
for the e⁄ect of longer terms on ￿ oor attendance is strikingly close to the estimates we
obtained for the House representatives. The implied percentage change in attendance by
long-term senators relative to the mean of the short term senators is 2% (the change was 3%
in the House experiment). However, a much larger standard error makes this point estimate
non-signi￿cant. The point estimate for the e⁄ect of longer terms on the number of bills
passed suggests that the number of bills passed are 27% higher for long-term legislators; the
coe¢ cient, however, is again not signi￿cant. We ￿nd a strongly signi￿cant e⁄ect of longer
15There were 71 senators (instead of 72) because one of the three seats belonging to the federal district
was left vacant until 2003. Like House representatives, senators are eligible for reelection and face no term
limits.
16One of the legislators resigned before the random allocation. Of the other ￿ve legislators two were
allocated to a two-year term, two were allocated to a four-year term, and one to a six-year term.
20terms on the number of bills introduced; the point estimate indicates that the number of
bills introduced is 49% higher for long-term senators. These estimates, stemming from a
second natural experiment in the Senate, broadly con￿rm the picture emerging from the
experiment in the Chamber of Deputies presented in Section 4, namely that longer terms
enhance legislative productivity.17
The experiment in the Senate also allows us to revisit the problem of what explains
the e⁄ects of longer terms. Panel 2 reports results from speci￿cations analogous to those
in Panel 1, but for two modi￿cations. First, we exclude from the sample all senators in
the two-year track, keeping only those in the four- and six-year tracks. Then we rede￿ne
the Long term variable to take the value of one for six-year senators and zero for the four-
year ones. In this speci￿cation the coe¢ cient for ￿ oor attendance is negative but far from
signi￿cant. The coe¢ cients for bills introduced and bills approved are both positive and
statistically signi￿cant. The implied increase in bills introduced for legislators in the six-
year track relative to the mean of those in the four-year track is of 81%. The increase
for bills approved is of 64%. Overall, the results in Panel 2 tend to favor the view that
six-year legislators perform better than four-year legislators during the ￿rst two years of
their tenures. At that early stage in their tenures campaigning considerations in Argentine
politics are e⁄ectively absent from political calculations. The fact that those legislators with
the longer term length perform better so far in advance further backs the idea that the time
horizon shapes incentives before campaigning becomes an issue. This reinforces the idea that
an investment logic overcomes the accountability logic.
Lastly, we inquire about the nature of the potential investments involved in legislative
activity. This is useful from the perspective of the optimal design of terms. One possibility
is that the investments made by legislators accumulate in a stock of expertise or advantage
that can be carried forward, and that once accumulated renders legislators unresponsive
to term lengths. This would be the case for instance if term lengths a⁄ected performance
because they foster learning by doing about generic legislative aspects. Another possibility
is that investments re￿ ect continuing and diverse opportunities that legislators never cease
to be interested in, provided they can be con￿dent about repayment. If the ￿rst possibility
were true, the investment logic would be relevant at relatively early stages of a legislator￿ s
career. Then it could be optimal to allow inexperienced legislators a long ￿rst term in order
to incentivize learning and initial investments, but it would be possible to have more senior
legislators face shorter terms in order to bene￿t then from stronger accountability. If the
17Conclusions remain unchanged when standard errors are clustered at the district level. When we consider
three treatments (two-, four-, and six-year terms) we ￿nd that the point estimate of being assigned to a four-
year term is, in most cases, possitive but smaller to the one associated to being assigned to a six-year term.
In other words, e⁄ects appear to get stronger the longer the term assigned.
21second possibility were true, term lengths could be determined without regard to seniority
(which is the case in reality).
In order to explore what type of investment predominates, we ask whether the e⁄ects
of term lengths are stronger for inexperienced legislators. In Panel 3 we estimate speci￿-
cations including an interaction between the Long term variable and Freshman. If generic
investments are what drive the investment logic, we would expect experienced legislators to
care less about what term length they get. In other words, we would expect the interaction
between Freshman and the Long term variable to be positive and signi￿cant. We ￿nd that
in all cases the interaction e⁄ect between Freshman and tenure is not signi￿cant, and in two
out of three cases it has the incorrect sign.18 We conclude that investments either depreciate
after a few years, or are related to varied and continuing opportunities that are also valu-
able for experienced legislators. As a result, nothing indicates that term lengths should be
determined with regard to seniority, since the bene￿ts of longer terms appear to accrue to
experienced legislators too.
7 Conclusion
Classic theories of electoral discipline (due to Barro 1973 and Ferejohn 1986) generate the
prediction that more frequent elections and shorter terms in o¢ ce will make politicians
more accountable. In the case of legislators, the extra accountability pressure should induce
better legislative performance. However, our empirical study relying on a natural experiment
in Argentina reveals the opposite pattern. We study the impact of randomly assigned term
lengths on six measures of legislative output by Argentine House representatives. The results
indicate that legislators serving a four-year term have a better performance than those in a
two-year track.
The use of a natural experiment allows us to overcome several identi￿cation problems that
usually a⁄ect studies of the determinants of political performance. Despite this advantage,
a study relying on a random assignment through lottery has limitations. One limitation is
of internal validity. It is possible that the outcome of a lottery may directly a⁄ect subjects
through a ￿frustration￿ (or, alternatively, ￿boost￿ ) e⁄ect which would presumably occur
right after the randomization and last for a short time. An examination of the data on
a monthly basis indicates that such e⁄ects are unlikely. Another limitation is of external
validity. A natural experiment is typically restricted to a speci￿c instance in time and
18We tested this hypothesis using our data from the House experiment, and found no support for it, just
as with the Senate data. The House data, however, is less suitable for the test than the one from the Senate
because the House members in our dataset entered Congress in 1983, after a long dictatorship. As a result,
only a handful of them had previous legislative experience, and the test is not very powerful.
22space, leaving open the important question of the extent to which the results that have been
obtained can be generalized. We take a step to address this second limitation by examining
data from a second, analogous, natural experiment in the Argentine Senate in 2001. This
second experiment shows results that are consistent with the picture emerging from the ￿rst.
An additional obstacle is that even if one can identify a causal e⁄ect, this is not enough
to pin down an interpretation about the mechanisms at play. In this paper we take steps
not just to investigate whether term lengths matter and in which direction, but also to gain
insight on how they matter. One possibility is that longer terms enhance the incentives
facing legislators to make investments that raise their productivity. But another, more
￿mechanical￿explanation is that legislators on a shorter track spend part of their two years
in o¢ ce worrying about their reelection campaign. Our data does not lend support for the
idea that campaigning drives results, while largely supporting the idea that time horizons
matter to legislators. Overall, our results and interviews with legislators point to the fact that
an investment logic seems to outweigh the accountability logic in the Barro-Ferejohn models.
Longer terms induce legislators to work harder because longer terms make it worthwhile to
incur costs attached to the legislative activity.
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Countries, and states in the United States of America 
2 
United States House of Representatives 
US states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming 
3  Australia, Bhutan, El Salvador, Mexico, Nauru, New Zealand, and Philippines 
4 
Albania, Andorra, Angola, Armenia, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu 
US states: Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, and North Dakota 
5 
Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, 
Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, India, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lesotho, 
Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, North Korea, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Republic of the Congo, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
6  Liberia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Yemen 
Note: when the legislature consists of a lower and an upper house, we consider the lower house. 
 Table 2. Distribution of legislators by province and political party for the random allocation of terms 
    Group 1 (later assigned a four-year term)  Group 2 (later assigned a two-year term) 
District  Total  UCR  PJ  PI  UCD  DC  AUT  MPJ  MPN  PB  Total  UCR  PJ  PI  UCD  LIB  MFP  MPN  PB  Total 
Capital  25  7  3  -  1  1  -  -  -  -  12  7  4  1  1  -  -  -  -  13 
Buenos Aires  70  18  16  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  35  19  15  1  -  -  -  -  -  35 
Catamarca  5  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  2  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  3 
Córdoba  18  6  3  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  9  5  4  -  -  -  -  -  -  9 
Corrientes  7  2  1  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  4  1  1  -  -  1  -  -  -  3 
Chaco  7  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  3  2  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  4 
Chubut  5  2  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  3  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  2 
Entre Ríos  9  2  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  4  3  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  5 
Formosa  5  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  3  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  2 
Jujuy  6  1  1  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  3  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  3 
La Pampa  5  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  2  1  1  -  -  -  1  -  -  3 
La Rioja  5  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  3  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  2 
Mendoza  10  3  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  5  3  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  5 
Misiones  7  2  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  4  2  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  3 
Neuquén  5  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  2  1  1  -  -  -  -  1  -  3 
Río Negro  5  2  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  3  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  2 
Salta  7  2  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  4  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  3 
San Juan  6  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  3  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  1  3 
San Luis  5  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  2  2  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  3 
Santa Cruz  5  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  2  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  3 
Santa Fe  19  5  5  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  10  5  4  -  -  -  -  -  -  9 
S. del Estero  7  2  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  4  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  3 
Tucumán  9  2  3  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  5  2  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  4 
T. del Fuego  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  2 
TOTAL  254  65  55  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  127  64  56  2  1  1  1  1  1  127 
Notes: UCR is Unión Cívica Radical; PJ is Partido Justicialista; PI is Partido Intransigente; UCD is Unión del Centro Democrático; DC is Democracia Cristiana; AUT is 
Partido Autonomista; MPJ is Movimiento Popular Jujeño; MFP is Movimiento Federalista Pampeano; MPN is Movimiento Popular Neuquino; PB is Partido Bloquista de San 
Juan; LIB is Partido Liberal.  
Table 3. Correlations among measures of legislative performance 












Floor attendance   1           
Committee attendance   0.39  1         
Committee bills  0.27  0.49  1       
Floor speeches  0.04  -0.09  -0.08  1     
Bills introduced  -0.02  0.05  0.18  0.04  1   
Bills ratified  0.16  0.03  0.07  0.15  0.13  1 
Note: correlations computed on raw data observed on yearly basis. Collapsing the data by individual yields 
similar results. 
Table 4. Summary statistics 
  Four-year track  Two-year track  Difference of means 
































































































Note: Leader is a dummy variable that takes the value one  when the legislator is the president of the 
chamber, a majority or minority leader, or a committee chair. Freshman is a dummy taking the value one for 
Representatives without any previous legislative experience at the national level. Slackness is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one when the legislator was elected in the top of the party-province delegation. 
Small block is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the legislator belongs to a party holding 
three or fewer seats. Distance is the distance (in hundred of kilometers) from the capital of the legislator’s 
district to Buenos Aires (the seat of the national legislature). Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant 
at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level, based on a t test on equality 
of means. Table 5. The effects of term length on legislative performance 
  Floor attendance  Committee attendance  Committee bills  Floor speeches  Bills introduced  Bills ratified 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Four-year term  2.513  2.548  5.635  6.259  0.133  0.175  0.263  0.122  0.133  0.184  0.753  0.669 
  (0.903)***  (0.846)***  (2.189)***  (2.040)***  (0.073)*  (0.080)**  (0.158)*  (0.146)  (0.149)  (0.114)*  (0.249)***  (0.251)*** 
  {1.076}**  {0.956}***  {2.764}**  {2.498}***  {0.999}  {0.108}*  {0.197}  {0.172}  {0.184}  {0.135}  {0.256}***  {0.249}*** 
Change  3%  3%  11%  12%  14%  19%  30%  13%  14%  20%  112%  95% 
Age    0.134    0.224    -0.002    -0.022    -0.004    -0.006 
    (0.040)***    (0.115)**    (0.004)    (0.009)***    (0.006)    (0.011) 
    {0.043}***    {0.135}*    {0.006}    {0.010}**    {0.007}    {0.012} 
Male     6.096    -0.875    0.101    -0.313    -0.218    -0.630 
    (2.331)***    (5.266)    (0.185)    (0.333)    (0.187)    (0.526) 
    {1.851}***    {6.127}    {0.228}    {0.395}    {0.206}    {0.636} 
Freshman    3.174    12.630    0.088    0.144    0.156    -0.281 
    (2.171)    (5.271)**    (0.224)    (0.287)    (0.281)    (0.434) 
    {2.410}    {6.898}*    {0.307}    {0.329}    {0.370}    {0.461} 
Lawyer    0.752    -0.702    0.034    0.732    0.092    0.055 
    (0.920)    (2.627)    (0.087)    (0.154)***    (0.144)    (0.237) 
    {1.040}    {3.152}    {0.119}    {0.187}***    {0.177}    {0.249} 
University degree    2.048    6.574    -0.061    0.981    0.028    0.186 
    (1.010)**    (3.023)**    (0.101)    (0.290)***    (0.156)    (0.341) 
    {1.085}*    {3.619}*    {0.133}    {0.305}***    {0.175}    {0.335} 
Leader    0.370    -2.086    -0.238    1.022    0.260    1.256 
    (1.370)    (3.900)    (0.141)*    (0.195)***    (0.183)    (0.303)*** 
    {1.593}    {4.987}    {0.191}    {0.250}***    {0.224}    {0.299}*** 
Slackness    -0.842    -6.683    -0.028    0.344    0.124    0.004 
    (0.829)    (1.992)***    (0.071)    (0.139)***    (0.116)    (0.233) 
    {0.930}    {2.408}***    {0.096}    {0.168}**    {0.138}    {0.238} 
Majority party    7.777    15.326    0.416    -0.484    -1.277    -0.270 
    (0.850)***    (2.282)***    (0.083)***    (0.147)***    (0.122)***    (0.251) 
    {0.929}***    {2.726}***    {0.113}***    {0.180}***    {0.149}***    {0.248} 
Small block    4.254    0.293    -0.154    1.474    -0.689    -0.282 
    (1.601)***    (4.597)    (0.189)    (0.228)***    (0.209)***    (0.658) 
    {1.790}**    {5.953}    {0.260}    {0.280}***    {0.249}***    {0.625} 
Distance    -0.387    -1.400    -0.061    -0.072    -0.003    -0.003 
    (0.098)***    (0.332)***    (0.018)***    (0.016)***    (0.027)    (0.031) 
    {0.078}***    {0.447}***    {0.017}***    {0.019}***    {0.020}    {0.041} 
District dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in braces. For OLS and Tobit models, Change is calculated 
as 100*Estimate/mean of the respective output for legislators in a two-year track. For Negbin (Negative Binomial) models, Change is calculated as exp(Estimate)-1. All 
models include time dummies. The number of observations is 492. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. Table 6. Tests for the campaigning hypothesis 
  Floor attendance  Committee attendance  Committee bills  Floor speeches  Bills introduced  Bills ratified 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Four-year term  2.488  2.890  2.931  6.201  0.122  0.021  0.231  0.015  0.339  0.447  0.769  1.117 
  (1.036)**  (1.279)**  (2.847)  (3.056)**  (0.108)  (0.124)  (0.181)  (0.236)  (0.150)**  (0.184)**  (0.260)***  (0.342)*** 
  {1.060}**  {1.452}**  {2.887}  {3.800}*  {0.112}  {0.169}  {0.180}  {0.275}  {0.150}**  {0.216}**  {0.259}***  {0.343}*** 
Four-year term   0.119    6.655    0.107    -0.216    -0.314    -0.372   
x Time  (1.624)    (3.969)*    (0.146)    (0.257)    (0.227)    (0.550)   
  {1.431}    {2.865}**    {0.056}**    {0.189}    {0.179}*    {0.553}   
Four-year term     -0.053    0.009    0.025    0.018    -0.043    -0.078 
x Distance    (0.124)    (0.341)    (0.014)*    (0.028)    (0.019)**    (0.041)** 
    {0.139}    {0.426}    {0.019}    {0.034}    {0.022}**    {0.041}** 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in braces. Time is an indicator variable that takes the value 
one for the second year. Distance is previously defined in Table 4 and in the text. All models include time dummies and legislators’ characteristics as additional covariates—
not shown to save space. The number of observations is 492. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 Table 7. Tests for the time-horizon/investment hypothesis 
  Floor attendance  Committee attendance  Committee bills  Floor speeches  Bills introduced  Bills ratified 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Four-year term  4.766  11.967  0.233  0.399  0.158  1.258 
  (1.201)***  (3.013)***  (0.107)**  (0.190)**  (0.162)  (0.357)*** 
  {1.306}***  {3.700}***  {0.145}*  {0.236}*  {0.186}  {0.388}*** 
Four-year term   -4.032  -10.374  -0.106  -0.512  0.046  -0.987 
x Slackness  (1.724)**  (4.094)***  (0.148)  (0.298)*  (0.234)  (0.516)** 
  {1.838}**  {4.962}**  {0.201}  {0.354}  {0.273}  {0.527}* 
Method  OLS  OLS  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin  Negbin 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in braces. Slackness captures electoral safety and is already 
defined in Table 4 and in the text. All models include time dummies and legislators’ characteristics as additional covariates—not shown to save space. The number of 
observations is 492. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.  
Table 8.  Evidence from the Senate 
  Panel 1  Panel 2  Panel 3 
  Floor attendance  Bills introduced  Bills ratified  Floor attendance  Bills introduced  Bills ratified  Floor attendance  Bills introduced  Bills ratified 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Long term  1.299  0.402  0.241  -0.485  0.595  0.492  0.179  0.574  0.265 
  (2.398)  (0.126)***  (0.197)  (2.626)  (0.144)***  (0.220)**  (3.822)  (0.214)***  (0.283) 
  {2.822}  {0.166}***  {0.221}  {2.832}  {0.188}***  {0.249}**  {4.435}  {0.288}**  {0.343} 
Change  2%  49%  27%  -0.58%  81%  64%       
Freshman x Long term              1.976  -0.297  -0.041 
              (5.186)  (0.271)  (0.393) 
              {6.162}  {0.363}  {0.442} 
Number of observations  130  130  130  88  88  88  130  130  130 
Method  OLS  Negbin  Negbin  OLS  Negbin  Negbin  OLS  Negbin  Negbin 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in braces. In Panels 1 and 3 Long term is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one for legislators in either a four-year or a six-year track and zero for those in the two-year track. In Panel 2 we report regressions excluding two-
year Senators, and where Long term is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for legislators in a six-year track and zero for those in a four-year track. Freshman is a 
dummy taking the value one for Senators without any previous legislative experience at the national level. Changes implied by coefficient estimates are calculated as in 
Table 5.  All  specifications include time dummies  and legislators’ characteristics as additional covariates—not shown to save space.  *Significant at the 10% level; 
**Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.   Figure 1. Monthly evolution of performance differential, by type of legislative outcome 
(Difference in means, 4-year vs 2-year tracks) 
 
Floor attendance
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
F
e
b
-
8
4
A
p
r
-
8
4
J
u
n
-
8
4
A
u
g
-
8
4
O
c
t
-
8
4
D
e
c
-
8
4
F
e
b
-
8
5
A
p
r
-
8
5
J
u
n
-
8
5
A
u
g
-
8
5
Floor  speeches
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
F
e
b
-
8
4
A
p
r
-
8
4
J
u
n
-
8
4
A
u
g
-
8
4
O
c
t
-
8
4
D
e
c
-
8
4
F
e
b
-
8
5
A
p
r
-
8
5
J
u
n
-
8
5
A
u
g
-
8
5
Bills introduced
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
F
e
b
-
8
4
A
p
r
-
8
4
J
u
n
-
8
4
A
u
g
-
8
4
O
c
t
-
8
4
D
e
c
-
8
4
F
e
b
-
8
5
A
p
r
-
8
5
J
u
n
-
8
5
A
u
g
-
8
5
Bills ratified
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
F
e
b
-
8
4
A
p
r
-
8
4
J
u
n
-
8
4
A
u
g
-
8
4
O
c
t
-
8
4
D
e
c
-
8
4
F
e
b
-
8
5
A
p
r
-
8
5
J
u
n
-
8
5
A
u
g
-
8
5